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ABSTRACT
Multiple changes in Earth’s climate system have been observed over the past decades. De-
termining how likely each of these changes are to have been caused by human influence, is
important for decision making on mitigation and adaptation policy. Here we describe an
approach for deriving the probability that anthropogenic forcings have caused a given ob-
served change. The proposed approach is anchored into causal counterfactual theory (Pearl
2009) which has been introduced recently, and was in fact partly used already, in the context
of extreme weather event attribution (EA). We argue that these concepts are also relevant,
and can be straightforwardly extended to, the context of detection and attribution of long
term trends associated to climate change (D&A). For this purpose, and in agreement with
the principle of fingerprinting applied in the conventional D&A framework, a trajectory of
change is converted into an event occurrence defined by maximizing the causal evidence
associated to the forcing under scrutiny. Other key assumptions used in the conventional
D&A framework, in particular those related to numerical models error, can also be adapted
conveniently to this approach. Our proposal thus allows to bridge the conventional frame-
work with the standard causal theory, in an attempt to improve the quantification of causal
probabilities. An illustration suggests that our approach is prone to yield a significantly
higher estimate of the probability that anthropogenic forcings have caused the observed
temperature change, thus supporting more assertive causal claims.
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1. Introduction
Investigating causal links between climate forcings and the observed climate evolution
over the instrumental era represents a significant part of the research effort on climate.
Studies addressing these aspects in the context of climate change have been providing over
the past decades, an ever increasing level of causal evidence that is important for decision-
makers in international discussions on mitigation policy. In particular, these studies have
produced far-reaching causal claims; for instance the latest IPCC report (Stocker et al. 2013),
AR5 hereafter, stated that “It is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant
cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.” An important part of this causal
claim, as well as many related others, regards the associated level of uncertainty. More
precisely, the expression “extremely likely” in the latter quote has been formally defined by
the IPCC (Mastrandrea et al. 2010) to correspond to a probability of 95%. The above quote
hence implicitly means that the probability that the observed warming since the mid-20th
century was not predominantly caused by human influence but by natural factors, is roughly
1 : 20. Based on the current state of knowledge, it means that it is not yet possible to fully
rule out that natural factors were the main causes of the observed global warming. This
probability of 1 : 20, as well as all the probabilities associated to the numerous causal claims
that can be found in the past and present climate literature and are summarized in AR5, are
critical quantities that are prone to affect the way in which climate change is apprehended
by citizens and decision makers, and thereby to affect decisions on the matter. It is thus of
interest to examine the method followed to derive them and, potentially, to improve it.
Aforementioned studies buttressing the above claim usually rely on a conventional attri-
bution framework in which “causal attribution of anthropogenic climate change” is under-
stood to mean “demonstration that a detected change is consistent with the estimated re-
sponses to anthropogenic and natural forcings combined, but not consistent with alternative,
physically plausible explanations that exclude important elements of anthropogenic forcings”
(Hegerl et al. 2010). While this definition has proved to be very useful and relevant, it offers
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a description of causality which is arguably overly qualitative for the purpose of deriving a
probability. In particular, it comes short of a mathematical definition of the word “cause”
and incidentally, of the “probability to have caused” that we in fact wish to quantify. Hence,
beyond these general guidance principles, the actual derivation of these probabilities is left
to some extent to the interpretation of the practitioner. In practice, causal attribution has
usually been performed by using a class of linear regression models (Hegerl and Zwiers 2011):
y =
p∑
f=1
βfxf + ε (1)
where the observed climate change y is regarded as a linear combination of p externally forced
response patterns xf with f = 1, ..., p referred to as fingerprints, and where ε represent of
internal climate variability and observational error (all variables are vectors of dimension n).
The regression coefficient βf accounts for possible error in climate models in simulating the
amplitude of the pattern of response to forcing f . After inference and uncertainty analysis,
the value of each coefficient βf and the magnitude of the confidence intervals determine
whether or not the observed response is attributable to the associated forcing. The desired
probability of causation, i.e. the probability that the forcing of interest f has caused the
observed change y is denoted hereafter P(f → y). It has often been equated to the probability
that the corresponding linear regression coefficient is positive1:
P(f → y) = P(βf > 0) (2)
A shortcoming of the conventional framework summarized in Equations (1) and (2) above,
is that a linear regression coefficient does not have any causal meaning from a formal stand-
point. As acknowledged by Pearl (2009), turning an intrinsically deterministic notion such
as causality into a probabilistic one, is a difficult general problem which has also long been
a matter of debate (Simpson 1951; Suppes 1970; Mellor 1995). Nevertheless, the current
1The notation P(βf > 0) corresponds to the confidence level associated to the confidence interval [0,+∞[
under a frequentist approach, and to the posterior probability that βf is positive under a Bayesian one.
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approach can be theoretically improved in the context of climate change where the values of
the probabilities of causation have such important implications.
Our proposal to tackle this objective is anchored into a coherent theoretical corpus of
definitions, concepts and methods of general applicability which has emerged over the past
three decades to address the issue of evidencing causal relationships empirically (Pearl 2009).
This general framework is increasingly used in diverse fields (e.g. in epidemiology, economics,
social science) in which investigating causal links based on observations is a central matter.
Recently, it has been introduced in climate science for the specific purpose of attributing
weather and climate-related extreme events (Hannart et al. 2015a), which we refer to as
‘extreme events’ hereafter. The latter article gave a brief overview of causal theory and
articulated it with the conventional framework used for the attribution of extreme events,
which is also an important topic in climate attribution. In particular, Hannart et al. (2015a)
showed that the key quantity referred to as the fraction of attributable risk (FAR) (Allen
2003; Stone and Allen 2005) which buttresses most extreme event attribution (EA) studies,
can be directly interpreted within causal theory.
However, Hannart et al. (2015a) did not address how to extend and adapt this theory
in the context of the attribution of climate changes occurring on longer timescales. Yet, a
significant advantage of the definitions of causal theory is precisely that they are relevant no
matter the temporal and spatial scale. For instance, from the perspective of a paleoclimatol-
ogist studying Earth’s climate over the past few hundred millions of years, global warming
over the past hundred and fifty years can be considered as a climate event. As a matter of
fact, the word “event” is used in paleoclimatology to refer to “rapid” changes in the climate
system, but ones that may yet last centuries to millennia. Where to draw the line is thus
arbitrary: one person’s long term trend is another person’s short term event. It should there-
fore be possible to tackle causal attribution within a unified methodological framework based
on shared concepts and definitions of causality. Doing so would allow to bridge the method-
ological gap that exists between EA and trend attribution at a fundamental level, thereby
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covering the full scope of climate attribution studies. Such a unification would present in
our view several advantages: enhancing methodological research synergies between D&A
topics, improving the shared interpretability of results, and streamlining the communication
of causal claims — in particular when it comes to the quantification of uncertainty, i.e. of
the probability that a given forcing has caused a given observed phenomenon.
Here, we adapt some formal definitions of causality and probability of causation to the
context of climate change attribution. Then, we detail technical implementation under stan-
dard assumptions used in D&A. The method is finally illustrated on the warming observed
over the 20th century.
2. Causal counterfactual theory
While an overview of causal theory cannot be repeated here, it is necessary for clarity
and self-containedness to highlight its key ideas and most relevant concepts for the present
discussion.
Let us first recall the so-called “counterfactual” definition of causality by quoting the
18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume: “We may define a cause to be an object
followed by another, where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.” In
other words, an event E (E stands for effect) is caused by an event C (C stands for cause)
if and only if E would not occur were it not for C. Note that the word event is used here in
its general, mathematical sense of subset of a sample space Ω. According to this definition,
evidencing causality requires a counterfactual approach by which one inquires whether or
not the event E would have occurred in a hypothetical world, termed counterfactual, in
which the event C would not have occurred. The fundamental approach of causality which
is implied by this definition is still entirely relevant in the standard causal theory. It may
also arguably be connected to the guidance principles of the conventional climate change
attribution framework and to the optimal fingerprinting models, in a qualitative manner.
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The main virtue of the standard causality theory of Pearl consists in our view in formalizing
precisely the above qualitative definition, thus allowing for sound quantitative developments.
A prominent feature of this theory consists in first recognizing that causation corresponds to
rather different situations and that three distinct facets of causality should be distinguished:
(i) necessary causation, where the occurrence of E requires that of C but may also require
other factors; (ii) sufficient causation, where the occurrence of C drives that of E but may
not be required for E to occur; (iii) necessary and sufficient causation, where (i) and (ii) both
hold. The fundamental distinction between these three facets can be visualized by using the
simple illustration shown in Figure 1.
While the counterfactual definition as well as the three facets of causality described above
may be understood at first in a fully deterministic sense, perhaps the main strength of Pearl’s
formalization is to propose an extension of these definitions under a probabilistic setting.
The probabilities of causation are thereby defined as follow:
PS(C → E) = P(E | do(C), C, E) , (3a)
PN(C → E) = P(E | do(C), C, E) , (3b)
PNS(C → E) = P(E | do(C), E | do(C)) . (3c)
where C and E are the complementaries of C and E, and where the notation do(.) means
that an intervention is applied to the system under causal investigation. For instance PS,
the probability of sufficient causation, reads from the above: the probability that E occurs
when C is interventionally forced to occur, conditional on the fact that neither C nor E
were occurring in the first place. Conversely PN, the probability of necessary causation, is
defined as the probability that E would not occur when C is interventionally forced to not
occur, conditional on the fact that both C and E were occurring in the first place. While
we omit here the formal definition of the intervention do(.) for brevity, the latter can be
understood merely as experimentation: applying these definitions thus requires the ability
to experiment. Real experimentation, whether in situ or in vivo, is often accessible in many
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fields but it is not in climate research for obvious reasons. In this case, one can thus only
rely on numerical in silico experimentation: the implications of this constraint are discussed
further.
While the probabilities of causation are not easily computable in general, their expres-
sion fortunately becomes quite simple under assumptions that are reasonable in the case of
external forcings (i.e. exogeneity and monotonicity):
PN(C → E) = max (1− p/p, 0) , (4a)
PS(C → E) = max (1− (1− p)/(1− p), 0) , (4b)
PNS(C → E) = max (p− p, 0) . (4c)
where p = P(E | do(C)) is the so-called factual probability of the event E in the real world
where C did occur and p = P(E | do(C)) is its counterfactual probability in the hypothetic
world as it is would have been had C not occurred. One may easily verify that Equation
(4) holds in the three examples of Figure 1 by assuming that the switches are probabilistic
and exogenous. In any case, under such circumstances, the causal attribution problem can
thus be narrowed down to computing an estimate of the probabilities p and p. The latter
only requires two experiments: a factual experiment do(C) and a counterfactual one do(C).
Equation (3) then yields PN,PS and PNS from which a causal statement can be formulated.
Each three probability PS, PN and PNS have different implications depending on the
context. For instance, two perspectives can be considered: (i) the ex post perspective of
the plaintiff or the judge who asks “does C bear the responsibility of the event E that did
occur?”; and (ii) the ex ante perspective of the planner or the policymaker who instead asks
“what should be done w.r.t. C to prevent future occurrence of E?”. It is PN that is typically
more relevant to context (i) involving legal responsibility, whereas PS has more relevance
for context (ii) involving policy elaboration. Both these perspectives could be relevant in
the context of climate change, and it thus makes sense to trade them off. Note that PS and
PN can be articulated with the conventional definition recalled in introduction. Indeed, the
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“demonstration that the change is consistent with (...)” implicitly corresponds to the idea
of sufficient causation, whereas “(...) is not consistent with (...)” corresponds to that of
necessary causation. The conventional definition therefore implicitly requires a high PS and
a high PN to attribute a change to a given cause.
PNS may be precisely viewed as a probability which combines necessity and sufficiency.
It does so in a conservative way since we have by construction that PNS ≤ min(PN,PS). In
particular, this means that a low PNS does not imply the absence of a causal relationship
because either a high PN or a high PS may still prevail even when PNS is low. On the
other hand, it presents the advantage that any statement derived from PNS asserting the
existence of a causal link, holds both in terms of necessity and sufficiency. This property
is thus prone to simplify causal communication, in particular towards the general public,
since the distinction no longer needs to be explained. Therefore, establishing a high PNS
may be considered as a suitable goal to evidence the existence of a causal relationship in a
simple and straightforward way. In particular, the limiting case PNS = 1 corresponds to the
fully deterministic, systematic and single-caused situation in Figure 1c — i.e. undeniably
the most stringent way in which one may understand causality.
3. Probabilities of causation of climate change
We now return to the question of interest: for a given forcing f and an observed evolution
of the climate system y, can y be attributed to f? More precisely, what is the probability
P(f → y) that f has caused y? We propose to tackle this problem by applying the causal
counterfactual theory to the context of climate change, and more specifically, by using the
three probabilities of causation PN, PS and PNS recalled above. This Section shows that
it can be done to a large extent similarly to the approach of Hannart et al. (2015a) for EA.
In particular, as in EA, the crucial question to be answered as a starting point consists of
narrowing down the definitions of the cause event C and of the effect event E associated to
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the question at stake — where the word “event” is used here in its general mathematical
sense of “subset”.
a. Counterfactual setting
For the cause event C, a straightforward answer is possible: we can follow the exact
same approach as in EA by defining C as “presence of forcing f” (i.e. the factual world that
occurred) and C as “absence of forcing f” (i.e. the counterfactual world that would have
occurred in the absence of f). Indeed, forcing f can be switched on and off in numerical
simulations of the climate evolution over the industrial period, as in the examples of Fig. 1
and as in standard EA studies. Incidentally, the sample space Ω consists in the set of all
possible climate trajectories in the presence and absence of f , including the observed one y.
In other words, all forcings other than f are held constant at their observed values as they
are not concerned by the causal question.
In practice and by definition, the factual runs of course always correspond to the his-
torical experiment (HIST hereafter), using the Climate Model Intercomparison Project’s
(CMIP hereafter) terminology as described by Taylor et al. (2012). The counterfactual runs
are obtained from the same setting as historical but switching off the forcing of interest. For
instance, if the forcing consists of the anthropogenic forcing then the counterfactual runs cor-
responds to the historicalNat (NAT hereafter) experiment i.e. Ω = {HIST runs; NAT runs}.
Likewise, if the forcing consists of the CO2 forcing, then the counterfactual runs corresponds
to the “all except CO2” experiment. However, no such runs are available in CMIP5
(https://cmip.llnl.gov/cmip5/docs/historical_Misc_forcing.pdf and Section 6 for
discussion). Lastly, it is worth underlining that the historicalAnt experiment, which com-
bines all anthropogenic forcings, thus corresponds to the counterfactual setting associated
to the natural forcings. Therefore, runs from the historicalAnt experiment are relevant for
the attribution of the natural forcings only, they are not relevant for the attribution of the
anthropogenic forcings under the present counterfactual causal theory.
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These definitions of C and Ω have an important implication w.r.t. the design of numerical
experiments in climate change attribution. In contrast with the design usually prevailing
in D&A (forcing f only), the latter experiments are required to be counterfactual (i.e. all
forcings except f). We elaborate further on this remark in Section 6.
b. Balancing necessity and sufficiency
To define the effect event E, we propose to follow the same approach as in EA, where E
is usually defined based on an ad hoc climatic index Z exceeding a threshold u:
E = {Z ≥ u} (5)
Thus, defining E implies choosing an appropriate variable Z and threshold u that reflect
the focus of the question while keeping in mind the implications of the balance between the
probabilities of necessary and sufficient causation. We now illustrate this issue and lay out
some proposals to address it.
Consider the question “Have anthropogenic CO2 emissions caused global warming?”.
Following the above, the event “global warming” may be loosely defined as a positive trend
on global Earth surface temperature, i.e. E = {Z ≥ 0} where Z is the global surface
temperature linear trend coefficient and the threshold u is zero. In that case, E nearly
always occurs in the factual world (p ' 1) but it is also frequent in the counterfactual one (p
medium) thus the emphasis is mostly on PS, i.e. on sufficient causation, while PN and PNS
will have moderate values (Fig. 2b,e). But if global warming is more restrictively defined as
a warming trend comparable to or greater than the observed trend, i.e. E = {Z ≥ z} where
u = z is the observed trend, then the event becomes nearly impossible in the counterfactual
world (p ' 0) but remains frequent in the factual one (p medium) thus the emphasis is
on PN, i.e. on necessary causation, while the values of PS and PNS will this time be low.
Therefore, the above two extreme definitions both yield a low PNS. But under a more
balanced definition of global warming as a trend exceeding an intermediate value u∗ ∈ [0, z],
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then the event nearly always occurs in the factual world (p ' 1) and yet remains very rare
in the counterfactual one (p ' 0). Hence PNS is then high: both necessary and sufficient
causation prevail. We propose to take advantage of this optimal value to define the event
“global warming” as the global trend index Z exceeding the optimal threshold u∗ such that
the amount of causal evidence, in a PNS sense, is maximized:
u∗ = argmaxu<z PNS(C → {Z ≥ u}) (6)
where the condition u < z insures that the event has actually occurred. When used on real
data (see Section 6), this approach yields a high value of PNS = 0.95 for the above question
(Figure 2b,e).
Let us now consider the question “Have anthropogenic CO2 emissions caused the Argen-
tinian heatwave of December 2013?” (Hannart et al. 2015b). Here, the event can be defined
as E = {Z ≥ u} where Z is surface temperature anomaly averaged over an ad-hoc space-
time window. Like in the previous case, the causal evidence agains shifts from necessary
and not sufficient (Fig. 2a,d) when u is equal to the observed value of the index z = 24.5◦C
(unusual event in both worlds but much more so in the counterfactual one) to sufficient and
not necessary when u is small (usual event in both worlds but much more so in the factual
one). Like in the previous case, a possible approach here would be to balance both quantities
by maximizing PNS in u as in Equation (6). However, this would lead here to a substantially
lower threshold which no longer reflects the rare and extreme nature of the event “heatwave”
under scrutiny. Furthermore, this would yield a well-balanced, but pretty low level of causal
evidence (PNS = 0.35). Thus maximizing PNS is not relevant here. Instead, maximizing
PN, even if that is at the expense of PS, is arguably more relevant here since we are dealing
with extreme events that are rare in both worlds, thereby inherently limiting the evidence of
sufficient causation. This maximization corresponds to u∗ = argmaxu<z PN(C → {Z ≥ u})
which often yields the highest observed threshold u = z. Therefore, PN (i.e. the FAR) is an
appropriate metric for the attribution of extreme events, and a high threshold u matching
with the observed value z should be used in order to maximize it. In contrast with extreme
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events, long term changes are prone to be associated with much powerful causal evidence
that simultaneously involves necessary and sufficient causation, and may yield high values
for PN, PS and PNS. PNS is thus an appropriate summary metric to consider for the attri-
bution of climate changes, in agreement with D&A guidance principles (Hegerl et al. 2010).
An optimal intermediate threshold can be chosen by maximizing PNS.
c. Building an optimal index
In the above example where “global warming” is the focus of the question, the variable of
interest Z to define the event can be considered as implicitly stated in the question, insofar
as the term “global warming” implicitly refers to an increasing trend on global temperature.
However, in the context of climate change attribution, we often investigate the cause of “an
observed change y” with no precise a priori regarding the characteristics of the change that
are relevant w.r.t. causal evidencing. Furthermore, y may be a large dimensional space-time
vector. Thus the definition of the index Z in this case is more ambiguous.
We argue that in such a case, the physical characteristics of y which are implicitly consid-
ered relevant to the causal question are precisely those which best enhance the existence of
a causal relationship in a PNS sense. This indeed corresponds to the idea of “fingerprinting”
used thus far in climate change attribution studies (as well as in criminal investigations,
hence the name): we seek a fingerprint, i.e. a distinctive characteristic of y which would
never appear in the absence of forcing f (i.e. p ' 0) but systematically does in its presence
(i.e. p ' 1). If this characteristic shows up in observations, then the causal evidence is
conclusive. A fingerprint may thus be thought of as a characteristic which maximizes the
gap between p and p and thereby maximizes PNS, by definition.
As an illustration, Marvel and Bonfils (2013) focus on the attribution of changes in pre-
cipitation, and subsequently address the question “Have anthropogenic forcing caused the
observed evolution of precipitation at a global level?”. Arguably, this study illustrates our
point in the sense that it addresses the question by defining a fingerprint index Z which
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aims precisely at reflecting the features of the change in precipitation that are thought to
materialize frequently (if not systematically) in the factual world and yet are expected to
be rare (if not impossible) in the counterfactual one, based on physical considerations. In
practice, the index Z defined by the authors consists of a non-dimensional scalar summa-
rizing the main spatial and physical features of precipitation evolution w.r.t. dynamics and
thermodynamics. The factual and counterfactual PDFs of Z are then derived from the HIST
and NAT runs respectively (Fig. 2c). From these PDFs, one can easily obtain an optimal
threshold u∗ for the precipitation index Z by applying Equation (6) (Fig. 2f). This yields
PNS = 0.43, i.e. anthropogenic forcings have about as likely as not caused the observed
evolution of precipitation.
A qualitative approach driven by physical considerations, such as the one of Marvel and
Bonfils (2013), is perfectly possible to define a fingerprint index Z that aims at maximizing
PNS. However, a quantitative approach can also help in order to define Z optimally, and
to identify the features of y that best discriminate between the factual and counterfactual
worlds. Indeed, the qualitative, physical elicitation of Z may be difficult when the joint
evolution of the variables at stake is complex or not well-understood a priori. Furthermore,
one may also wish to combine lines of evidence by treating several different variables at the
same time in y (i.e. precipitation and temperature, Yan et al. (2016)). Let us introduce
the notation Z = φ(Y ) where Y is the space-time vectorial random variable of size n which
observed realization is y, and φ is a mapping from Rn to R. Extending Equation (6) to
the simultaneous determination of the optimal mapping φ∗ and optimal threshold u∗, we
propose the following maximization:
(u∗, φ∗) = argmaxu<φ(y), φ∈Φ PNS(C → {φ(Y ) ≥ u}) (7)
In words, we thus propose to choose the value of the threshold, but also to choose the index φ
among the set all possible indexes Φ, so as to maximize PNS. The event E∗ = {φ∗(Y ) ≥ u∗}
defined above in Equation (7) may thus be referred to as the optimal fingerprint w.r.t. forcing
f . The maximization performed in Equation (7) also suggests that our approach shares some
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similarity with the method of Yan et al. (2016), insofar as the variables of interest are in
both cases selected mathematically by maximizing a criterion which is relevant for attribution
(i.e. potential detectability in Yan et al. (2016), PNS in the present article), rather than by
following qualitative, physics- or impact-oriented, considerations.
4. Implementation under the standard framework
We now turn to the practical aspects of implementing the approach described in Section
3 above, based on the observations y and on climate model experiments. We detail these
practical aspects in the context of the standard framework briefly recalled in Section 1, i.e.
multivariate linear regression under a Gaussian setting. Note that the assumptions underly-
ing the latter conventional framework could be challenged (e.g. pattern scaling description
of model error and gaussianity). However, the purpose of this section is not to challenge
these assumptions. It is merely to illustrate in detail how these assumptions can be used
within the general causal framework proposed. Furthermore, the details of the mathematical
derivation shown in this subsection can not be covered exhaustively here in order to meet
the length constraint. However, some important steps of the derivation are described in Ap-
pendix A, and the complete details and justification thereof can be found in the references
given in the text.
a. Generalities
The maximization of Equation (7) requires the possibility to evaluate the probabilities
of occurrence p and p, in the factual and counterfactual world, of the event {φ(Y ) ≥ u},
for any φ and u. For this purpose, it is convenient to derive beforehand the factual and
counterfactual PDFs of the random variable Y , denoted [Y | f ] and [Y | f ] respectively.
14
Assuming their two first moments are finite, we introduce:
E (Y | f) = µ , V (Y | f) = Σ
E
(
Y | f) = µ , V (Y | f) = Σ (8)
The means µ and µ represent the expected response in the factual and counterfactual worlds;
it is intuitive that their difference µ−µ will be key to the analysis. The covariances Σ and Σ
represent all the uncertainties at stake, they must be carefully determined based on additional
assumptions. To avoid repetition in presenting these assumptions, we will detail them for
the factual world only, but they will be applied identically in both worlds.
As recalled above, in situ experimentation on the climate system is not accessible, thus
we are left with in silico experimentation as the only option. While the increasing realism of
climate system models renders such an in silico approach plausible, it is clear that modeling
errors associated to their numerical and physical imperfections should be taken into account
into Σ. In addition, sampling uncertainty and observational uncertainty, which are com-
monplace sources of uncertainty in dealing with experimental results in an in situ context
as well, should also be taken into account. Finally, internal climate variability also needs to
be factored. The latter four sources of uncertainty can be represented by decomposing Σ
into a sum of four terms:
Σ = C + Q + R + S (9)
where the component C represents climate internal variability; Q represents model un-
certainty; R represents observational uncertainty; and S represents sampling uncertainty.
Assumptions regarding the latter four sources of uncertainty are also key in the conventional
Gaussian linear regression framework recalled in Section 1. We therefore propose to take
advantage of some assumptions, data and procedures that have been previously introduced
under the conventional framework, and adapt them to specify µ, C, Q, R and S. The sta-
tistical model specification below can thus be viewed as an extension of developments under
the conventional framework, in particular those exposed in Hannart (2016). The various pa-
rameters and data involved, as well as their conditioning, are summarized in the hierarchical
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model represented in Figure 3, which we now describe.
b. Model description
As in the conventional linear regression formulation recalled in Equation (1), we assume
that the random variable Y is Gaussian with mean xβ and covariance C + R:
[Y | β,x,C,R ] = N (xβ,C + R) (10)
In the conventional framework, climate models are assumed to correctly represent the re-
sponse patterns x but to err on their amplitude. Recognizing that the scaling factors β
thereby aim at representing the error associated to models, we prefer to treat β as a random
variable instead of a fixed parameter to be estimated. The latter factors are also assumed
to be Gaussian:
[ β | ω ] = N (e, ω2I) (11)
where we assume that the expected value of β is e = (1, ..., 1)′, and ω is a scalar parameter
which will be determined further in this Section. Combining Equations (10) and (11), it
comes (Appendix A):
[Y | µ,x,C,R, ω ] = N (µ,C + R + ω2xx′) (12)
where µ = xe =
∑p
i=1 xi. Equation (12) thus shows that it is possible to translate the
pattern scaling term xβ from the mean of Y to the covariance of Y . We believe such a
mean-covariance translation is relevant here, since the pattern scaling assumption is meant
to represent a source of uncertainty. Furthermore, the covariance Q associated to the latter
source of uncertainty can be represented by the component ω2xx′, which results from the
random scaling of the individual responses x1, x2, ..., xp. Furthermore, the expected value of
Y , denoted µ, is equal to the sum of the latter individual responses. Under the additivity
assumption prevailing in the conventional framework, µ thus corresponds to the model re-
sponse under the scenario where the p forcings are present. Hence, µ can be obtained by
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estimating directly the combined response as opposed to estimating the individual responses
x1, x2, ..., xp one by one and summing them up. Such a direct estimation of µ is indeed
advantageous from a sampling error standpoint, as will be made clear immediately below.
The PDF of Y in Equation (12) involves three quantities µ, x and C that needs to
be estimated from a finite ensemble of model runs denoted E, which of course introduces
sampling uncertainty. Assuming independence among runs, it is straightforward to show
that (Appendix A):
[µ | C,E ] = N (µ̂, 1
r
C) , [xi | C,E ] ∼ N (x̂i, 1ri C) for i = 1, ..., p (13)
where x̂i is the ensemble average for the individual response i; µ̂ is the ensemble average
for the combined response; ri is the number of runs available for the individual response to
forcing i; r is the number of combined forcings runs. Combining Equations (12) and (13),
and after some algebra, it comes (Appendix A):
[Y | C,R,E, ω ] = N (µ̂,C + R + ω2x̂x̂′ + λC) (14)
with λ = 1/r+ ω2
∑
i 1/ri, and where the sampling uncertainty S on the responses µ and x
thus corresponds to the term λC. On the other hand, the internal variability component C
also has to be estimated from the r0 preindustrial control runs, which introduces additional
sampling uncertainty. The sampling uncertainty on C can be treated by following the
approach of Hannart (2016), which introduces an Inverse Wishart conjugate prior for C.
This leads an Inverse Wishart posterior for C which has the following expression (Appendix
A):
[ C | E ] = IW(Ĉ, ν̂) (15)
where the estimated covariance Ĉ consists of a so-called shrinkage estimator:
Ĉ = â∆̂ + (1− â)Ω̂ (16)
where Ω̂ is the empirical covariance of the control ensemble; ∆ is a shrinkage target matrix
taken here to be equal to diag(Ω̂) i.e. ∆̂ii = Ω̂ii and ∆̂ij = 0 for i 6= j; the shrinkage
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intensity â is obtained from the marginal likelihood maximization described in Hannart et
al. (2014); and ν̂ = 2 + r0/(1− â).
Combining Equations (14) and (15), and after some algebra and an approximation, it
comes (Appendix A):
[Y | E, ω, σ ] = St(µ̂, σ2I + ω2x̂x̂′ + (1 + λ)Ĉ, ν̂) (17)
where we adopted the simplified parametric form R = σ2I for the covariance of observational
error, and where St(µ,Σ, ν) is the multivariate t distribution with mean µ, variance Σ and ν
degrees of freedom. Equation (17) implies that taking into account the sampling uncertainty
on C does not affect the total variance of Y . Instead, it only affects the shape of the PDF
of Y , which has thicker tails than the Gaussian distribution. With these parameterizations,
our model for Y is thus a parametric Student t model with two parameters (σ, ω).
After computing the estimators µ̂, x̂, Ĉ and ν̂ using the ensemble of model experiments
as described above, the parameters (σ, ω) are estimated by fitting the above model to the
observation y based on likelihood maximization. The log-likelihood of the model has the
following expression:
`(σ, ω; y) = −1
2
log |(1 + λ)Ĉ + σ2I + ω2x̂x̂′|
−1
2
(ν̂ + n) log
(
1 + 1
ν̂−2(y − µ̂)′
(
(1 + λ)Ĉ + σ2I + ω2x̂x̂′
)−1
(y − µ̂)
) (18)
The estimators σ̂ and ω̂ are then obtained numerically using a standard maximization al-
gorithm (e.g. gradient descent). With µ̂ being obtained from factual runs (i.e. HIST runs)
and x̂ containing all the forcings including f , this procedure thus yields the PDF of Y in
the factual world:
[Y | f ] = St(µ̂, Σ̂, ν̂)
Σ̂ = (1 + λ̂)Ĉ + σ̂2I + ω̂2x̂x̂′
(19)
Next, to obtain
[
Y | f ], one simply needs to change the mean µ̂ to µ̂ obtained as the en-
semble average for the counterfactual experiment “all forcings except f”. Some changes also
need to be made regarding the covariance. Indeed, since forcing f is absent in the counter-
factual world, the model error covariance component ω̂2x̂f x̂
′
f , corresponding to the random
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scaling of the response x̂f to forcing f , must be taken out of the covariance. Furthermore, if
the number of counterfactual runs r differ from the number of factual runs r, the sampling
uncertainty Ĉ/r associated to estimating µ also has to be modified. The PDF of Y in the
counterfactual world can thus be written:[
Y | f ] = St(µ̂, Σ̂, ν̂)
Σ̂ = Σ̂− ω̂2x̂f x̂′f + (1r − 1r )Ĉ
(20)
As noted above, when f is anthropogenic forcing, the counterfactual experiment NAT is
usually available in CMIP runs, allowing for a straightforward derivation of µ̂. But for other
forcings, by the design of CMIP experiments, counterfactual runs are usually not available.
A possible workaround then consists in applying the additivity assumption to approximate
µ̂ with µ̂− x̂f . For instance, if CO2 is the forcing of interest, the counterfactual response to
all forcings except CO2 emissions can be approximated by subtracting the CO2 individual
response xf from the all forcings response. However in that case, the sampling uncertainty
term Ĉ/rf corresponding to the estimation of x̂f must be added to the covariance Σ̂.
c. Derivation of the probabilities of causation
With the two PDFs of Y in hand, an approximated solution to the maximization of
Equation (7) can be conveniently obtained by linearizing φ, yielding a closed mathematical
expression for the optimal index φ∗(Y ):
φ∗(Y ) = (µ̂− µ̂)′Σ̂−1Y (21)
Equation (21) is a well known result of Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) (McLachlan
2004). Details of approximations made and of the mathematical derivation of Equation
(21) are given in Appendix B. The optimal index Z∗ = φ∗(Y ) can thus be interpreted as
the projection of Y onto the vector Σ̂
−1
(µ̂ − µ̂) which will be denoted φ∗ hereinafter, i.e.
φ∗(Y ) ≡ φ∗′Y .
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To obtain PNS, we then need to derive the factual and counterfactual CDFs of Z = φ∗(Y ),
denoted G and G respectively. Since no closed form expression of these CDFs is available,
we simulate realizations thereof. Drawing two samples of N random realizations of Y from
the Student t distributions [Y | f ] and [Y | f ] is straightforward, by treating the Student
t as a compound Gaussian–Chi-squared distribution. Samples of Z are then immediately
obtained by projecting onto φ∗ and the desired CDFs can be estimated using the standard
kernel smoothing estimator (Bowman and Azzalini 1997), yielding Ĝ(u) and Ĝ(u) for all
u ∈ R. Finally, PNS∗ follows as:
PNS∗ = Ĝ(u∗)− Ĝ(u∗) (22)
and:
PN∗ = 1− 1− Ĝ(u
∗)
1− Ĝ(u∗) , PS
∗ = 1− Ĝ(u
∗)
Ĝ(u∗)
(23)
where u∗ = argmaxu<z {Ĝ(u)− Ĝ(u)}.
d. Reducing computational cost
When the dimension of y is large, the above described procedure can become prohibitively
costly if applied straightforwardly, due to the necessity to derive the inverse and determinant
of Σ̂ at several steps of the procedure. However, the computational cost of these operations
can be drastically reduced by applying the Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury formula (Woodbury
1950), which states that the inverse of a low rank correction of some matrix can be computed
by doing a low rank correction to the inverse of the original matrix. Omitting the notation
.̂ for more clarity, we have:
Σ−1 = A−1 − ω2A−1x(I + ω2x′A−1x)−1x′A−1 (24)
where A = (1 + λ)C + σ2I can be inverted using the same formula:
A−1 = B−1 − 1
r0
(1 + λ)(1− a)B−1x0(I + 1r0 (1 + λ)(1− a)x′0B−1x0)−1x′0B−1 (25)
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where B = (1+λ)a∆+σ2I. Likewise, we apply the Sylvester formula (Sylvester 1851) twice
to compute the determinant of Σ:
|Σ| = |A| . |I + ω2x′A−1x|
= |B| . |I + 1
r0
(1 + λ)(1− a)x′0B−1x0| . |I + ω2x′A−1x|
(26)
Independently of n, the matrices I+ω2x′A−1x is of size p, I+ 1
r0
(1+λ)(1−a)x′0B−1x0 is of size
r0, and B is diagonal. Obtaining their inverse and determinant is therefore computationally
cheap. Hence, the inverse and determinant of Σ can be obtained at a low computational
cost by applying first Equation (25) to determine A−1 and second Equations (24) and (26).
5. Illustration on temperature change
Our methodological proposal is applied to the observed evolution of Earth’s surface tem-
perature during the 20th century, with the focus being restrictively on the attribution to
anthropogenic forcings. More precisely, y consists of a spatial-temporal vector of size n = 54
which contains the observed surface temperatures averaged over 54 time-space windows.
These windows are defined at a coarse resolution: Earth’s surface is divided into 6 regions of
similar size (3 in each hemisphere) while the period 1910-2000 is divided into 9 decades. The
decade 1900-1910 is used as a reference period, and all values are converted to anomalies
w.r.t. the first decade. The HadCRUT4 observational dataset (Morice et al. 2012) was used
to obtain y. With respect to climate simulations, the runs of the IPSL-CM5A-LR model
(Dufresne et al. 2012) for the NAT, ANT, HIST and PIcontrol experiments were used (see
Appendix C for details) and converted to the same format as y after adequate space-time
averaging.
Following the procedure described in Section 4, we successively derived the estimated
factual response µ̂ using the r HIST runs; the estimated counterfactual response µ̂ using the
r NAT runs; the estimated individual responses x1 and x2 using the r1 NAT runs and r2
ANT runs respectively (p = 2 and x = (x1, x2)); the estimated covariance Ĉ from the r0
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PIcontrol runs. Then, we derived σ̂ and ω̂ by likelihood maximization, to obtain Σ̂ and Σ̂.
An assessment of the relative importance of the four components of uncertainty was ob-
tained by deriving the trace of each component (i.e. the sum of diagonal terms) normalized
to the trace of the complete covariance. Climate variability is found to be the dominant
contribution, followed by model uncertainty, observational uncertainty and sampling un-
certainty (not shown). The split between model and observational uncertainty is to some
extent arbitrary as we have no objective way to separate them based only on y, i.e. the model
could be equivalently formulated as Q = ω2xx′ + (1 − α)σ2I and R = ασ2I. An objective
separation would require an ensemble representing observational uncertainty, allowing for a
preliminary estimation of R.
The optimal vector φ∗, designed to capture the space-time patterns that best discriminate
the HIST evolution and the NAT one, was then obtained from Equation (21). To identify
which features of Y are captured by this optimal mapping, the coefficients (φ∗1, ..., φ
∗
n) were
averaged spatially and temporally, and were plotted in Figure 4. Firstly, it can be noted
that the coefficients’ global average 〈φ∗〉 = ∑ni=1 φ∗i is large and positive: a major discrim-
inant feature is merely global mean temperature, as expected. Secondly, the coefficients
also exhibit substantial variation around their average 〈φ∗〉 in both space and time. Spa-
tial variations of φ∗ unsurprisingly suggest that, beyond global mean temperature, other
discriminant features include the warming contrast prevailing between the two hemispheres
and/or between low and high latitudes (the low resolution prevent from a clear separation),
as well as between ocean and land (Fig. 4a). Temporal variations of φ∗ suggest that discrim-
inant features includes the linear trend increase as expected, but also higher order temporal
variations (Fig. 4b).
The PDFs of the optimal index Z = φ∗
′
Y were derived, and are plotted in Figure 5,
together with PNS as a function of the threshold u. The maximum of PNS determines the
desired probability of causation:
P(ANT→ y) = 0.9999 (27)
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In IPCC terminology, this would mean that anthropogenic forcings have virtually certainly
caused the observed evolution of temperature, according to our approach. More precisely,
the probability that the observed evolution of temperature is not caused by anthropogenic
forcings is one in then thousands (1:10,000) instead of one in twenty (1:20). Therefore, the
level of causal evidence found here is substantially higher than the level assessed in the IPCC
report. This discrepancy will be discussed in Section 6.
Before digging into this discussion, it is interesting to assess the relative importance of
the “trivial” causal evidence coming from the global increase in temperature, and of the less
obvious causal evidence coming from space-time features captured by φ∗. For this purpose,
we merely split φ∗ into the sum of a global average contribution
∑n
i=1〈φ∗〉Yi and of the
remaining variations
∑n
i=1(φ
∗
i − 〈φ∗〉)Yi. The PDFs of the resulting indexes are plotted in
Figure 5a,b. Their bivariate PDF can also be visualized with the scatterplot of Figure 5c.
The following two probabilities of causation are obtained:
P(ANT→ 〈y〉) = 0.9781
P(ANT→ y − 〈y〉) = 0.9994
(28)
where 〈y〉 refer to the globally averaged evolution and y − 〈y〉 refer to other features of
evolution. Therefore, while the globally averaged warming provides alone a substantial level
of evidence (i.e. P(ANT → 〈y〉) = 0.9781), these results suggest that the overwhelmingly
high overall evidence (i.e. P(ANT → y) = 0.9999) is primarily associated to non-obvious
space-time features of the observed temperature change.
6. Discussion
a. Comparison with previous statements
The probabilities of causation obtained by using our proposal may depart from the levels
of uncertainty asserted by the latest IPCC report, and/or by previous work. For instance,
when y corresponds to the evolution of precipitation observed over the entire globe during the
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satellite era (1979-2012), we have shown in Section 3 that, using the dynamic-thermodynamic
index built by Marvel and Bonfils (2013), the associated probability of causation P(ANT→
y) is found to be 0.43. This probability is thus significantly lower than the one implied by the
claim made in this study that “the changes in precipitation observed in the satellite era are
likely to be anthropogenic in nature” wherein “likely” implicitly means P(ANT→ y) ≥ 0.66.
In contrast with the situation prevailing for precipitation, when y corresponds to the
observed evolution of Earth’s surface temperature during the 20th century, and in spite of
using a very coarse spatial resolution, we found a probability of causation P(ANT → y) =
0.9999 which considerably exceeds the 0.95 probability implied by the latest IPCC report.
Such a gap deserves to be discussed.
Firstly, the probability of causation defined in our approach is of course sensitive to the
assumptions that are made on the various sources of uncertainty, all of which are here built
into Σ. Naturally, increasing the level of uncertainty, for instance through an inflation factor
applied to Σ, reduces the probability of causation (Figure 6). In the present illustration,
uncertainty needs to inflated by a factor 2.4 to obtain P(ANT → y) = 0.95 in agreement
with the IPCC statement. Therefore, a speculative explanation for the gap is that experts
may be adopting a conservative approach by implicitly inflating uncertainty, although not
explicitly, perhaps in an attempt to account for additional sources of uncertainty that are
not well known. In the present case, such an inflation should amount to 2.4 to explain the
gap. This number is arguably too high to provide a satisfactory standalone explanation, yet
overall, such a conservativeness may partly contribute to the discrepancy when it comes to
temperature. In any case, this highlights the need for a more explicit and consistent use of
conservativeness — if any.
Besides the effect of inflating the individual variances, it is important to note that the
probability of causation may also be greatly reduced when the correlation coefficients of
the covariance Σ, whether spatial or temporal, are inflated. This less straightforward effect
can be explained by the fact that higher correlations imply greater spatial and temporal
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coherence of the noise, which is thus more prone to confounding with a highly coherent
signal, and thereby reduces the probability of causation. Conservativeness may thus be
associated to an inflation of correlations, in addition to an inflation of variances.
Another possible explanation for the discrepancy is more technical. Many previous at-
tribution studies buttressing the IPCC statement regarding temperature, are based on an
inference method for the linear regression model of Equation (1) which is not optimal w.r.t.
maximizing causal evidence — despite of it being often referred to as “optimal fingerprint-
ing”. More precisely, the inference on the scaling factors β and the associated uncertainty
quantification, are obtained by projecting the observation y as well as the patterns x onto
the leading eigenvectors of the covariance C associated to climate internal variability. Such a
projection choice sharply contrasts with the projection used in our approach, which is indeed
performed onto the vector φ∗ = Σ−1(µ− µ). Denoting (v1, ..., vn) the eigenvectors of Σ and
(λ1, ..., λn) the corresponding eigenvalues, the expression of φ
∗ can be written:
φ∗ =
n∑
k=1
〈vk | µ− µ〉
λk
. vk (29)
Equation (29) shows that projecting onto φ∗ does not emphasize the leading eigenvectors
of Σ, in contrast to the aforementioned standard projection. Instead, it emphasizes the
eigenvectors that simultaneously present a low eigenvalue λk and a strong alignment with
the contrast between the two worlds µ − µ. As a matter of fact, the ratio 〈vk | µ − µ〉/λk
can be interpreted as the signal-to-noise ratio associated to the eigenvector vk, where the
eigenvalue λk quantifies the magnitude of the noise and 〈vk | µ − µ〉 that of the causal
signal. Projecting onto φ∗ thus maximizes the signal-to-noise ratio. In contrast, since C is a
large contribution to Σ (the dominant one in our illustration), a projection onto the leading
eigenvectors of C naturally tends to amplify the noise, and to partly hide the relevant causal
signal µ− µ.
In order to assess whether or not these theoretical remarks hold in practice, we revisited
our illustration and quantified the impact on P(ANT → y) of using such a projection onto
the leading eigenvectors of C. For this purpose, after computing the projection matrix P on
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the ten leading eigenvectors of C, our procedure was applied identically, but this time using
the projected vector φ+ = Pφ∗. Results are shown in Figure 7, again after splitting the
contribution of global mean change and patterns of change. Unsurprisingly, the probability
of causation associated to the global mean change remains unmodified at 0.978. However, the
probability of causation associated to the space-time features of warming drops from 0.9994
to 0.92. Indeed, the features that most discriminate the two worlds, and are summarized in
φ∗, do not align well with the leading eigenvectors of C. They are thus incompletely reflected
by the projected vector φ+ (Figure 8). Furthermore, the uncertainty of the resulting index
Z+ = φ+
′
Y is high by construction, as the magnitude of climate variability is maximized
when projecting onto its leading modes. This further contributes to reducing P(ANT→ y)
to 0.992.
b. Counterfactual experiments
Our methodological proposal has an immediate implication w.r.t. the design of stan-
dardized CMIP experiments dedicated to D&A: a natural option would be to change the
present design “forcing f only” into a counterfactual design “all forcings except f”. Indeed,
P(f → y) is driven by the difference µ − µf between the factual response µ (i.e. historical
experiment) and the counterfactual response µf (i.e. all forcings except f experiment). Un-
der the assumption that forcings do not interact with one another and that the combined
response matches with the sum of the individual responses, the difference µ − µf coincides
with the individual response xf (i.e. forcing f only experiment). While this hypothesis is
well established for temperature at large scale (Gillett et al. 2004), it appears to break down
for other variables (e.g. precipitation, (Shiogama et al. 2013)) or over particular regions
(e.g the Southern extratropics, (Morgenstern et al. 2014)) where forcings appear to signifi-
cantly interplay. Such a lack of additivity would inevitably damage the results of the causal
analysis. It is thus important in our view to better understand the domain of validity of
the forcing-additivity assumption and to evaluate the drawbacks of the present “one forcing
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only” design versus its advantages. Such an analysis does require “forcing f only” experi-
ments, but also “all forcings except f” experiments in order to allow for comparison. This
effort would hence justify including in the DAMIP set of experiments an “all forcings except
f” experiment — which is presently absent even in the lowest priority tier thereof — at least
for the most important forcings such as anthropogenic CO2.
c. Benchmarking high probabilities
Section 5 showed that the proposed approach may sometimes yield probabilities of cau-
sation that are very close to one. How can we communicate such low levels of uncertainty?
This question arises insofar as the term “virtual certainty” applies as soon as PNS exceeds
0.99 under the current IPCC language. Thus, this terminology would be unfit to express in
words a PNS increase from 0.99 to 0.9999, say — even though such an increase corresponds
to a large reduction of uncertainty by a factor one hundred. One option to address this issue
is to use instead the uncertainty terminology of theoretical physics, in which a probability is
translated into an exceedance level under the Gaussian distribution, measured in numbers
of σ from the mean (where σ denotes standard deviation), i.e. F−1(PNS)σ with F the CDF
of the standard Gaussian distribution. Under such terminology, “virtual certainty” thus cor-
responds to a level of uncertainty of 2.3σ, while P(ANT → y) = 0.9999 found in Section 5
reaches 3.7σ. It is interesting to note that the level of uncertainty officially requested in theo-
retical physics to corroborate a discovery as such — e.g. the existence of the Higgs Boson —
is 5σ. By applying such standards, one may actually consider that P(ANT→ y) = 0.9999 is
still too low a probability to corroborate that human influence has indeed been the cause of
the observed warming. Whether or not such standards are relevant in the particular context
of climate change — which relates to defining the proper level of aversion to false discovery
suitable in that context — are discutable matters. In any case, increasing P(ANT → y)
beyond the “virtual certainty” threshold of 0.99 by building more evidence into the analysis,
is possible and may still be considered as a relevant research goal.
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d. Alternative assumptions
The mathematical developments of Section 4 are but an illustration of how our proposed
causal approach, as framed in Section 3, can be implemented when one uses the conventional
assumptions of pattern scaling and gaussianity associated to the standard linear regression
setting. In that sense, Section 4 thus shows that the proposed causal framing is perfectly
compatible with the conventional linear regression setting: it should be viewed as an exten-
sion of, rather than an alternative to, the latter setting. Nevertheless, it is important to
underline that the application of the causal framework of Section 3 is by no means restricted
to the conventional linear regression setting. One may for instance challenge some aspects of
the latter, e.g. the pattern scaling description of model error, and formulate an alternative
parameterization of the covariance Σ. This does not affect the relevance of the maximization
of Equation (7), which can be implemented similarly.
e. Attribution as a classification problem
Lastly, it should be noted that the maximization of Equation (7) can be viewed as
a binary classification problem. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 5, solving Equation (7)
is equivalent to building a function of observations which allows to optimally discriminate
between two “classes”: the factual class and the counterfactual class. Under this perspective,
PNS is related to the % of correct classification decisions made by the classifier and is thus
a measure of its skill.
Viewing the fingerprinting index φ∗ as a classifier offers a fruitful methodological angle
in our opinion. Indeed, classification is a classic and widespread problem in statistics and
machine learning for which numerous solutions are readily available. For instance, under
the restrictive assumptions of Section 4 — among which the Gaussian assumption — one
obtains a linear classifier under a closed form expression, which is well known in Linear
Discriminant Analysis (McLachlan 2004). But more recent developments have focused on
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the non Gaussian situations where a nonlinear classifier is more suitable, and can be for-
mulated for instance using as diverse approaches as random forests, support vector machine
or neural nets (Alpaydin 2010). Testing such approaches for the present attribution prob-
lem certainly offers promise. However, the difficulty to physically interpret such complex
classifiers represent a challenge in such approaches.
7. Summary and conclusion
We have introduced an approach for deriving the probability that a forcing has caused a
given observed change. The proposed approach is anchored into causal counterfactual theory
(Pearl 2009) which has been introduced recently in the context of EA. We argued that these
concepts are also relevant, and can be straightforwardly extended to the context of climate
change attribution. For this purpose, and in agreement with the principle of fingerprinting
applied in the conventional D&A framework, a trajectory of change is converted into an
event occurrence defined by maximizing the causal evidence associated to the forcing under
scrutiny. Other key assumptions used in the conventional D&A framework, in particular
those related to numerical models error, can also be adapted conveniently to this approach.
Our proposal thus allows to bridge the conventional framework with the standard causal
theory, in an attempt to improve the quantification of causal probabilities. Our illustration
suggested that our approach is prone to yield a higher estimate of the probability that
anthropogenic forcings have caused the observed temperature change, thus supporting more
assertive causal claims.
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APPENDIX A
Derivation of the PDF of Y
To obtain Equation (12) from Equation (10) and (11), we integrate out β:
[Y | x,C,R ] = ∫
β
[Y | β,x,C,R ] . [ β | ω ] dβ (A1)
Given the quadratic dependence to β of the two terms under the integral in the right hand
side of Equation (A1), it is clear that the PDF of the left hand side is also Gaussian. Thus,
instead of computing the above integral, it is more convenient to derive the mean and variance
of this PDF by applying the rule of total expectation and total variance:
E(Y | x,C,R) = E (E(Y | β,x,C,R) | x,C,R) = E (xβ | x,C,R) = xE (β)
= xe
V(Y | x,C,R) = V (E(Y | β,x,C,R) | x,C,R) + E (V(Y | β,x,C,R) | x,C,R)
= V (xβ | x,C,R) + E (C + R | x,C,R)
= xV(β)x′ + C + R = ω2xx′ + C + R
[Y | x,C,R ] = N (xe,C + R + ω2xx′)
(A2)
Next, in order to account for the sampling uncertainty on the estimation of µ, we apply
Bayes theorem to derive the PDF of µ conditional on the ensemble E. Denote µ(1), ..., µ(r)
the r simulated responses in E which are assumed to be i.i.d. according to a Gaussian with
mean µ and covariance C. We have:
[µ | C,E ] ∝ Πrj=1
[
µ(j) | C ] . [µ ]
∝ Πrj=1 N (µ(j) | µ,C)
= N (µ | µ̂, 1
r
C)
(A3)
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where µ̂ is the empirical mean of the ensemble, and we use the improper prior [µ ] ∝ 1. The
exact same approach yields [xi | C,E ] ∝ Πrij=1 N (x(j)i | xi,C) = N (xi | x̂i, 1ri C).
To integrate out µ, we proceed by following the same reasoning as above for integrating
out β. Since the resulting PDF is clearly Gaussian, it suffices to derive its mean and variance:
E(Y | x,C,R,E) = E (E(Y | µ,x,C,R,E) | x,C,R,E) = E (µ | x,C,R,E)
= µ̂
V(Y | x,C,R,E) = V (E(Y | µ,x,C,R,E) | x,C,R,E) + E (V(Y | µ,x,C,R,E) | x,C,R,E)
= V (µ | x,C,R) + E (ω2xx′ + C + R | x,C,R,E)
= 1
r
C + ω2xx′ + C + R
(A4)
Likewise, to integrate out x, we derive the total mean and total variance:
E(Y | C,R,E) = E (E(Y | x,C,R,E) | C,R,E) = E (µ̂ | C,R,E)
= µ̂
V(Y | C,R,E) = V (E(Y | x,C,R,E) | C,R,E) + E (V(Y | x,C,R,E) | C,R,E)
= 0 + (1 + 1
r
)C + R + E (ω2xx′ | C,E)
= (1 + 1
r
)C + R + ω2
∑
i E (xi x′i | C,E)
= (1 + 1
r
)C + R + ω2
∑
i V (xi | C,E) + ω2
∑
i E (xi | C,E)E (xi | C,E)′
= (1 + 1
r
)C + R + ω2
∑
i
1
ri
C + ω2
∑
i x̂i x̂
′
j
= (1 + 1
r
+ ω2
∑
i
1
ri
)C + R + ω2x̂x̂′
= C + R + ω2x̂x̂′ + λC
(A5)
with λ = 1/r + ω2
∑
i 1/ri. Note that [Y | C,R,E ] is no longer Gaussian after integrating
out x, because x appears in the covariance of [Y | x,C,R,E ]. However, for simplicity, we
approximate it to be Gaussian.
The sampling uncertainty on the covariance matrix C is addressed by using an approach
described in Hannart et al. (2014) which main ideas are succinctly recalled here. The reader
is referred to the publication for details and explicit calculations. In summary, we apply
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Bayes theorem in order to derive [ C | E ], as for µ and x. However, we use this time an
informative conjugate prior on C, as opposed to an improper prior.
[ C |∆, a ] = IW(∆, a) (A6)
where ∆ denotes the a priori mean of C and a is a scalar parameter that drives the a
priori variance. Furthermore, the mean and variance parameters (∆, a) of this informative
prior are estimated from E by maximizing the marginal likelihood `(a,∆) associated to this
Bayesian model.
`(a,∆) = ( a r0
1−a + n+ 1) log | a1−a∆| − ( r01−a + n+ 1) log |Ω̂ + a1−a∆|
+ 2 log
(
Γn{12( r01−a + n+ 1)} /Γn{12( a r01−a + n+ 1)}
)
.
(A7)
where Γn is the n−variate Gamma function and Ω̂ = x0x′0/r0 is the empirical covariance.
The estimators (â, ∆̂) satisfy to:
(â, ∆̂) = argmaxa∈[0,1], ∆∈F `(a,∆), (A8)
where F is a set of definite positive matrices chosen to introduce a regularization constraint
on the covariance. Here we choose F = {diag(δ1, ..., δn) | δ1 > 0, ..., δn > 0} the set of definite
positive diagonal matrices, and we derive an approximated solution to Equation (A8) with
∆̂ = diag(Ω̂) and â = argmaxa∈[0,1] `(a, ∆̂). Because the prior PDF is fitted on the data,
this approach can be referred to as “empirical bayesian”. The “fitted” prior [ C | ∆̂, â ] is
then updated using the ensemble E, and the obtained posterior has a closed form expression
due to conjugacy:
[
C | E, ∆̂, â
]
∝ [ E | C ] . IW(∆̂, â) = IW(Ĉ, â′) (A9)
where Ĉ = â∆̂ + (1 − â)Ω̂ and â′ = 1/(2 − â). We can then use the above posterior to
integrate out C in the PDF of Y , in order to obtain [Y | E,R, ∆̂, â ]:
[
Y | E,R, ∆̂, â
]
=
∫
C
[Y | C,R,E ] .
[
C | E, ∆̂, â
]
dC (A10)
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The integral above does not have a closed form expression because the variance Σ = R +
ω2x̂x̂′ + (1 + λ)C of [Y | C,R,E ] is not proportional to C. To address this issue, we
approximate [ Σ | E, ∆̂, â ] by IW(R+ω2x̂x̂′+(1+λ)Ĉ, â′). This assumption is conservative
in the sense that it extends the sampling uncertainty on C to R + ω2x̂x̂′ + (1 + λ)C even
though R + ω2x̂x̂′ is a constant. It yields a closed form expression of the above integral
thanks to conjugacy:
[
Y | E,R, ∆̂, â
]
= St(µ̂,R + ω2x̂x̂′ + (1 + λ)Ĉ, ν̂) (A11)
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APPENDIX B
Optimal index derivation
Let us solve the optimization problem of Equation (7) under the above assumptions.
For simplicity, we restrict our search to so called “half-space” events which are defined by
E = {Y ∈ Ωf | φ′Y ≥ u} where φ′Y is a linear index with φ a vector of dimension n, and u
is a threshold. Let us consider PNS as a function of φ and u.
PNS(φ, u) = P(φ′Y ≥ u | f)− P(φ′Y ≥ u | f) (B1)
For simplicity, we will use an expression of PNS(φ, u) in the treatment of the optimization
problem which approximates [φ′Y | f ] by a Gaussian PDF, even though it is a Student t PDF
from the calculations of Section 4. Note that this approximation is made restrictively here
for deriving an optimal index. Once this index is obtained, it is the then the true Student t
PDF of Y that will be used to derive the desired value of PNS. Therefore, the implication
of this approximation is to yield an index which is suboptimal and thereby underestimates
the maximized value PNS∗.
PNS(φ, u) = F
(
u−φ′µ√
φ′Σφ
)
− F
(
u−φ′µ√
φ′Σφ
)
(B2)
where F is the standard Gaussian CDF. The first order condition in u, ∂PNS(φ, u)/∂u = 0,
thus yields:
exp
(
− (u−φ′µ)2
2φ′Σφ
)
= exp
(
− (u−φ′µ)2
2φ′Σφ
)
(B3)
Next, we introduce a third approximation Σ ' Σ to solve Equation (B3), yielding:
u∗ = 1
2
φ′(µ+ µ)
⇒ PNS(φ, u∗) = 2F
(
φ′(µ−µ)
2
√
φ′Σφ
)
− 1
(B4)
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Then, the first order condition in φ, ∂PNS(φ, u∗)/∂φ = 0, yields:
(φ′Σφ)(µ− µ) = (φ′(µ− µ))Σφ
⇒ φ∗ = Σ−1(µ− µ)
(B5)
which proves Equation (21). Figure 5c illustrates this solution and also shows that the opti-
mization problem of Equation (7) may be viewed as a classification problem. Our proposal
to solve Equation (7) is in fact similar to a commonplace classification algorithm used in
machine learning and known as Support Vector Machine (SVM) (Cortes and Vapnik 1995).
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APPENDIX C
Data used in illustration
As in Hannart (2016), observations were obtained from the HADCRUT4 monthly tem-
perature dataset (Morice et al. 2012), while GCM model simulations were obtained from the
IPSL CM5A-LR model (Dufresne et al. 2012), downloaded from the CMIP5 database. An
ensemble of runs consisting of two sets of forcings was used, the natural set of forcings (NAT)
and the anthropogenic set of forcings (ANT) for which three runs are available in each case
over the period of interest and from which an ensemble average was derived. On the other
hand, a single preindustrial control run of 1000 years is available and was thus split into ten
individual control runs of 100 years. Temperature in both observations and simulations were
converted to anomalies by subtracting the time average over the reference period 1960-1991.
The data was averaged temporally and spatially using a temporal resolution of ten years.
Averaging was performed for both observations and simulations by using restrictively values
for which observations were non missing, for a like-to-like comparison between observations
and simulations.
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Term Probability
Virtually certain ≥ 0.99
Extremely likely ≥ 0.95
Very likely ≥ 0.90
Likely ≥ 0.66
About as likely as not > 0.33 and < 0.66
Unlikely ≤ 0.33
Very unlikely ≤ 0.10
Exceptionally unlikely ≤ 0.01
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Fig. 1. The three facets of causality. (a) Bulb E can never be lit unless switch C1 is on,
yet activating C1 does not always result in lighting E as this also requires turning on C2:
turning on C1 is thus a necessary cause of E lighting, but not a sufficient one. (b) E is lit
any time C1 is turned on, yet if C1 is turned off E may still be lit by activating C2: turning
on C1 is thus a sufficient cause of E lighting, but not a necessary one. (c) Turning on C1
always lights E, and E may not be lighted unless C1 is on: turning on C1 is thus a necessary
and sufficient cause of E lighting.
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Fig. 2. Probabilities of causation in three different climate attribution situations. Upper
panels (a,b,c) : factual PDF (red line) and counterfactual PDF (blue line) of the relevant
index Z, observed value z of the index (vertical black line). Lower panels (d,e,f): PN, PS and
PNS for the event {Z ≥ u} as a function of the threshold u. Left column (a,d): attribution
of the Argentinian heatwave of December 2013. Middle column (b,e): attribution of the 20th
century temperature change. Left column (c,f): attribution of the precipitation change over
the satellite era (Marvel and Bonfils 2013).
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Fig. 3. Structural chart of the statistical model introduced in Section 4: underlying hierarchy
of parameters (i.e. unobserved quantities, circles); and data used for inference (i.e. observed
quantities, squares).
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 4. Illustration on the 20th century temperature change: optimal mapping φ∗. (a)
components of φ∗ averaged spatially. (b) components of φ∗ averaged temporally.
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Fig. 5. Illustration on the 20th century temperature change: results. (a) Factual PDF
(red line) and counterfactual PDF (blue line) of the global mean index, observed value (thin
vertical black line); PNS as a function of the threshold u (thick black line). (b) Same as (a)
for the space-time pattern index. (c) Scatterplot of factual (red dots) and counterfactual
(blue dots) joint realizations of the global mean index (horizontal axis) and of the space-time
pattern index (vertical axis). (d) Same as (a) for the optimal index Z = φ∗(Y ).
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Fig. 6. PNS as a function of the inflation factor applied to all uncertainty sources: global
mean alone (light green line), space-time pattern (dark green line), total (thick black line).
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Fig. 7. Same as Figure 5 for the mapping φ+ projected onto the leading eigenvectors of C.
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Fig. 8. Same as Figure 4 for the mapping φ+ projected onto the leading eigenvectors of C.
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